Neuroscientific perspective of the agency: is it problematic for the law?

dc.contributor.author	Cornejo Plaza, Maria Isabel
dc.date.accessioned	2023-02-27T19:15:42Z
dc.date.available	2023-02-27T19:15:42Z
dc.date.issued	2022-01-01
dc.identifier	10.22201/iij.24487937e.2022.16.17039
dc.identifier.issn	20074387
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12728/10244
dc.description.abstract	Kantian moral agency has served as the theoretical basis for moral and legal foundations of the autonomy of the will. However, neuroscience has shown that Kantian rational agency is not a good fit for contemporary subjects and thus the evidence leads us to wonder about its repercussions in the field of law. This paper begins by noting the differences between Kantian agency and what neuroscientific studies have found. It goes on to discuss whether this discrepancy could pose a problem for law and the reasons behind it.	es_ES
dc.language.iso	es	es_ES
dc.publisher	Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico	es_ES
dc.subject	Agency	es_ES
dc.subject	Autonomy	es_ES
dc.subject	Free Will	es_ES
dc.subject	Kant	es_ES
dc.subject	Neurosciences	es_ES
dc.title	Neuroscientific perspective of the agency: is it problematic for the law?	es_ES
dc.title.alternative	Perspectiva neurocientifica de la agencia: ¿es problemática para el derecho?	es_ES
dc.type	Article	es_ES

Repositorio Académico